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In order to appreciate the arguments offered by Professor Eskridge in
his Dunwody Lecture, I think a review of the relevant entries in the
ongoing discussion regarding the enforcement of morality would help us
understand the context in which that debate takes place. That review also
offers us a broader basis for thinking about these issues than the narrower
focus, important as it is, on the continuing evolution of United States
constitutional law. An exploration of the ideas on this subject of the
foremost legal thinkers of the latter half of the twentieth century also
provides a considerably broader context for our understanding than even
the cultural history that Professor Eskridge clearly enjoys detailing.
More specifically, I believe that we must start with the Report of the
Wolfenden Committee, because that is where the contemporary debate on
the enforcement of morality begins. But that Report based its
recommendations on the harm principle of John Stuart Mill, so that is
actually the real beginning point. On the other hand, the Report did refocus
academic attention on Mill once again and launched a broad colloquy on
the question of harm. For Mill, that turns out to be the right to be left
alone. John Kaplan argues that secondary harms have to be considered, but
they would interfere with privacy only on the fringes. Lord Patrick
Devlin's fear of societal disintegration makes him willing to breach that
ideal, but only when he believes that society is threatened with
disintegration. H.L.A. Hart criticizes Devlin and claims to defend Mill.
But Hart's embrace of paternalism poses a threat to autonomy. Lon Fuller
also criticizes Mill, but he produces a positive conception of freedom that
advances the debate considerably.
I find the work of Emile Durkheim provocative, as well as that of some
lesser known sociologists. Durkheim's fear of anomie justifies for him
some inroads on privacy, but only because of the important public interest
in maintaining social solidarity. In my own previous musings on this topic,
I worry about the distinct challenges of a polycultural society, because of
the threat to freedom posed by moral crusades that manufacture deviance
and generate negative reciprocity. Instead, I advocate a pursuit of positive
toleration as an indispensable ingredient in the healthy development of our
society. But to start with the Wolfenden Committee, we must turn our
attention back fifty years.
I. THE WOLFENDEN COMMITTEE CREATES A STIR
The 1950's is when the modern debate begins, specifically with the
appointment of the Wolfenden Committee as an arm of the British
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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Parliament.2 Its mandate was to study what revisions, if any, should be
made to the criminal laws regulating sexual offenses.3 They deliberated for
several years and came back with a report in 1957.' Their
recommendations included not criminalizing prostitution by individuals.5
Procuring, maintaining a house of prostitution, and living from the
earnings of prostitutes would remain criminal offenses. 6 However, the
proposal that received by far the greatest public attention was the
recommendation that homosexual activity between consenting adults no
longer be a criminal offense. 7 Not surprisingly, that proposition attracted
considerable debate.8 The basis on which the Wolfenden Committee made
its recommendations was, essentially, a restatement of the famed "harm"
principle of John Stuart Mill.
A. Mill's Harm Principle
Although Mill was the leading Utilitarian philosopher of the latter part
of the nineteenth century, his harm principle is undoubtedly his most
famous statement. Moreover, he makes it in his least utilitarian, but bestknown, work, the Essay on Liberty.9 There, his defense of liberty is as
uncompromising as he can make it. Consider the conviction he expresses
on the subject:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons
for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at para. 224.
Id. at 189-90.
See id. at 187.
See, e.g., PATRICKDEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1972); H.L.A. HART, LAW,

LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); BASIL MITCHELL, LAW, MORALITY, AND RELIGION INA SECULAR
SOCIETY (1967).
9. J.S. MILL, Essay on Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
American ed. Repository,
1951).
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him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To
justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only
part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. 10
When we remember the nineteenth century context in which Mill wrote,
the scope of his injunction becomes even broader than it seems now. At
that time, if the poet wished the inspiration of opium or some other
narcotic, he merely purchased it from his druggist. Such matters, and many
others, were not regulated by law, let alone made criminal." So Mill
cannot have been arguing against legal regulations of paternalistic origin
that would not come into being for a generation or more. In short, the legal
environment in which Mill writes is quite libertarian by our present
standards. Hence, although he opposes legal regulations on paternalistic
grounds, he is even more concerned about improper social pressures. He
argues against ostracizing someone simply because we believe her
behavior is unwise. We can try to reason with a person, but it is wrong to
gossip about or shun that person simply because we disapprove of his or
her life-style. Social sanctions should not be employed against someone,
unless her behavior actually harms someone else. Hence, unless we can
show harm to others, as in the participation of non-adults, we would not
be able to make a case that would satisfy Mill against consensual, adult
homosexual behavior.
B. Can Harms Be Indirect?
The more challenging turn comes when we attempt to define what
actually constitutes harm, at least as Mill would accept it. To begin, it
seems clear that Mill would require that the harm be direct and tangible.
One consequence of that view is that there is no place in his calculus for
indirect harms. But can we categorically exclude them from relevance to
public policy decisions? For example, the late John Kaplan of Stanford
Law School argued that certain indirect harms could be relevant in framing
legislation.' 2 Kaplan names four, but they are really two pairs. These
secondary harms are modeling/categorical imperative and public
ward/non-support.13

10. Id. at 73.
11. John Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971 DuKE L.J. 1065, 1072.
12. Id. at 1065.
13. Id. at 1066-67.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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1. Modeling and the Categorical Imperative
The modeling harm would occur when a famous baseball player uses
steroids. The harm results when millions of youngsters who wish to grow
up to be like the star also turn to steroid use. The categorical imperative is
similar. Based on Immanuel Kant's famous imperative, it commands that
we should always will that everyone should act as we do. 4 We must
always will that our actions be universalized. If one believes that a little
cocaine is alright, then one should also believe that it would be good for
all to behave in that same way. We may note an ambiguity in Kant's
imperative in that it cuts differently depending upon how broadly or
narrowly the 'universal' is stated. For example, if we say that one
engaging in homosexual activity must will that everyone should do
likewise, we would come to a negative conclusion. On the other hand, if
we state the principle more broadly as in our will that adults should seek
satisfying consensual sexual activity, then we would come to a different,
and universalizable, conclusion.
2. Public Ward and Non-support
The public ward harm addresses the motorcycle rider who rides without
a helmet and suffers severe brain damage in an accident. The public is left
to provide for the care of the improvident but carefree cyclist; all taxpayers
contribute to support that foolish act. The non-support harm is similar.
Here focus turns to the inability of the brain-damaged cyclist to provide for
those who are dependent upon him. The dependents, and the public who
will be called upon to step into the breach, are harmed. Kaplan contends
that all of these secondary harms may be relevant in formulating public
policy. 5 All of them are examples of harms that would not be included in
Mill's concept of direct harm. We would probably see no obvious
application to the question of legitimizing homosexual behavior in these
indirect harms. However, one objection might be based on the worry that
homosexual couples are much less likely to have children, thereby placing
a drain on the taxation and security systems that depend on the existence
of succeeding generations.
C. What ConstitutesHarm Anyway?
Moreover, limiting harm only to direct harms is not the only problem
for Mill's simple principle. Even the concept of direct harm itself requires

14. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 18 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1997)

(discussing the categorical imperative);

IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE

METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 22 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 1785) (same).
at 1065-67.2005
supra note 12,
Kaplan,
15. by
SeeUF
Published
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5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 5 [2005], Art. 3
1102

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

further exploration to help us define what might actually constitute
"harm." First, the concept of harm depends on social and cultural
definitions. You cannot define theft without a concept of property, and we
know that perceptions of property vary culturally. 6 Second, we cannot
really justify classifying something as a harm unless we carry out an
empirical study of the actual consequences. 7 Far too many restrictions of
liberty have been justified on the grounds of imagined dire consequences,
in the absence of any real information about the subject. Much twentieth
century regulation was adopted without the benefit of any solid factual
foundation. Emotion was frequently substituted as a motivation for law
without any weighing of the costs and benefits of the proposal. 8 We now
accept the adoption of Prohibition as one such large mistake. But far too
much regulation was adopted on the basis of bias and prejudice against
groups not considered within the mainstream of society. A major emphasis
of Eskridge's argument is that legal restrictions on adult homosexual
behavior provide a glaring example of exactly this kind of unjustified
legislation. 1"
From the foregoing, we clearly see that Mill's harm principle has been
routinely ignored in legislative deliberations. However strong Mill's
expression of his convictions may have been, his ideas nevertheless
remained merely a standard component of the undergraduate liberal arts
reading canon for almost a century, until 1954. Then, for the first time, in
the deliberations of the Wolfenden Committee, Mill's harm principle came
to play a leading role in the formation of public policy. Consider the
Committee's statement:
[T]he function of the criminal law.., is to preserve public
order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is
offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards
against exploitation and corruption of others, particularly
those who are specially vulnerable because they are young,
weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special
physical, official or economic dependence.

16. See Ernest Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, 28 THE HUMANIST, No. 3, 20-27 (MayJune 1968), reprintedin ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 265, 271 (T. Beauchamp ed., 1975).

17. Id. at 272.
18. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 12, at 1068, 1071.
19. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
ConstitutionofDisgust and Contagion,57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2005) (arguing that "[t]he new
politics was both aggressively negative, invoking themes of disgust and contagion, as well as
surprisingly positive, realigning Protestants and Catholics, blacks and whites in a new identity
arrayed around marriage and family").
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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It is not ... the function of the law to intervene in the private
lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern
of behaviour, further than is necessary to carry out the
purposes we have outlined.

[A decisive reason for this limitation is] the importance which
society and the law ought to give to individual freedom of
choice and action in matters of private morality. Unless a
deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through the
agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of
sin, there must remain a realm of private morality and
immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private
immorality.2"
I feel certain that Mill would have loved the phrase, "not the law's
business." He could hardly have put the proposition more plainly himself.
1I. LORD DEVLIN'S FEAR OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The Report of the Wolfenden Committee generated considerable
debate, initially in Britain, and subsequently in North America. The first
notable entry in the debate came from a distinguished member of the
English judiciary. Lord Patrick Devlin was invited by the British Academy
to give the prestigious Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence 2 not long
after the Committee had released its report in 1957. He tells us that he
initially set out to defend the recommendations of the Wolfenden
22
Committee. However, as he prepared his lecture and worked through his
reasoning process, he came to the opposite conclusion. 23 He decided that
he must oppose their proposals. His reasons for doing so are what interest
us. He offers two grounds for rejecting their proposal.
A. The "Conservative" Thesis
The first need not detain us too long, because it proves too much. It has
been referred to as the "conservative" thesis. 24 That thesis holds that any

20.
21.
22.
23.

14, 77).
Id. at 1-25.
See DEVLIN, supra note 8, at v.
See DEVLIN, supra note 8, at vii ("But study destroyed instead of confirming the simple
DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 2-3 (quoting Wolfendon Report, supra note 1,

faith in which I had begun my task; and the Maccabean Lecture ...

which persuaded me that I was wrong.").
at 47.
supra note 8,Repository,
24. byMITCHELL,
Published
UF Law Scholarship
2005

is a statement of the reasons
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society has the right to conserve its own traditions, to preserve the
practices that are distinctive to its culture." At first glance, the idea seems
unobjectionable. Some British authors, such as Basil Mitchell, have used
it as a basis to justify the tutorial method of instruction at Oxford.26 The
argument was also used to support continuation of the strict Sunday bluelaws in predominantly Methodist Wales.27 The problem, however, is that
the conservative thesis would also justify continuation of human sacrifice
by the Aztecs, for example-a practice they considered fundamental to the
preservation of their culture and even of the physical world.28 The
conservative thesis would also justify the preservation of the institution of
slavery in the antebellum South. Although disgusting to us, slavery
constituted a distinctive and central feature of that society, as the leading
apologist for the Old South, John C. Calhoun, made very clear.29 The
thesis could also be deployed in defense of such stomach-churning
violations of fundamental human rights as female genital mutilation, a
practice considered centrally important in some subcultures." ° As Eskridge
makes clear, the conservative argument has been employed widely and
frequently in attempts to justify discrimination against homosexuals.31
Hence, the conservative thesis, although promising at first blush, simply
paints.with far too broad a brush to be of any use as a principle.
B. The Social DisintegrationThesis
Devlin's second justification, on the other hand, is more interesting and
clearly seems to be his favorite. The social disintegration thesis holds that
a society must preserve its fundamental morality in order not to
disintegrate.32 We can imagine the power of this idea to the British
schoolboy who labored through Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the

25. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 11.
26. MITCHELL, supra note 8, at 31-32.

27. Id. at 34-35.
28. See P.J. Gladnick, Aztec
aztecsacrifice raif.htm.

Human Sacrifice

(2002), http://nv.essortment.com/

29. John C. Calhoun, Disquisitionon Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN

52-59 (R.K. Cralle ed., 1851).
30. See World Health Organization, Female Genital Mutilation, Fact Sheet No. 241 (June
2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/index.html.
31. See generally Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1013 (discussing the Save Our Children
campaign that interpreted the Constitution as allowing "the state to exclude and suppress people
(homosexuals) who flaunted their disgusting practices and threatened to pollute the body politick").
32. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 10 ("[W]ithout shared ideas on politics, morals, and ethics no
society can exist .... If men and women try to create a society in which there is no fundamental
agreement about good and evil they will fail; ... the society will disintegrate."); see also id. at 13-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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Roman Empire.33 Imagine then the emotional force of that idea to someone
who has watched as the once globally-extensive British Empire has been
reduced to those modest islands just across Le CanalAnglais (the English
Channel) from the European Continent. Clearly, the prospect of
disintegration holds considerable emotional power for Devlin.
How would Lord Devlin put his thesis into practice? As a judge, he
thinks in terms ofjuries. So, if he can take twelve average citizens and get
them to agree unanimously that a certain practice is so disgusting that it is
beyond the bounds of tolerance, then he is prepared to use the law with
gusto to shore up that particular strand of morality. He visualizes his
average citizen as "the man in the Clapham omnibus."34 Clapham is a
working class suburb of London, and the omnibus is simply the typical
English double-decker public bus. We would express the same idea by
talking about 'Joe Six-pack' or 'Bubba.' He believes that any proposition
they can agree on unanimously should be outlawed.35 In this way, he
believes that he can identify those aspects of morality that are so
fundamental to the character of the society that the law must support them
in order to ward off disintegration. At the time of his lecture, Devlin
believed that adult homosexuality was sufficiently disgusting that the
practice was beyond toleration.36
Moreover, Devlin believes that a society has a right to shore up its
morality in the same way that it is justified in punishing treason.37 Treason
tries to bring down the established government. Undermining fundamental
morality similarly eats away at the foundations of society. As Devlin
himself says:
If society has a right to make a judgment and has it on the
basis that a recognized morality is as necessary to society as,
say, a recognized government, then society may use the law
to preserve morality in the same way as it uses it to safeguard
anything else that is essential to its existence.38
However, many critics of Devlin's position have pointed out that treason
is a very direct attack on the established government. In contrast, the
erosion of any particular strand of morality is likely to be an indicator of
change within the society. But to stretch from that recognition to the
conclusion that the society itself is being destroyed by the erosion of some
33.

EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (2003).

34. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 15.

35. See Leonard Birmingham et al., Letters to the Editor, Law on Homosexuals, TIMES
(London), May 11, 1965, at 13 [hereinafter Law on Homosexuals].
36. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 17-18.

37. Id. at 13.
at Law
13-14.
38. byId.
Published
UF
Scholarship Repository, 2005
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particular aspect of morality is a giant step even for a Gulliver, and much
too great a leap to be credible.
III. EVALUATING DEVLIN'S POSITION

Devlin's critics have also voiced strident objections to his fundamental
proposition that the erosion of morality becomes the disintegration of
society. All of them concede that some kind of generally accepted morality
is an essential glue of any society. But they cannot accept the proposition
that the destruction of any specific canon of morality could cause the
disintegration of society. One of Devlin's harshest critics, Professor
H.L.A. Hart, expressed his disagreement with Devlin's central view by
contending that it was "absurd":
[T]o move from the acceptable proposition that some shared
morality is essential to the existence of any society to the
unacceptable proposition that a society is identical with its
morality as that is at any given moment of its history, so that
a change in its morality is tantamount to the destruction of a
society. The former proposition might be even accepted as a
necessary rather than an empirical truth depending on a quite
plausible definition of society as a body of men who hold
certain moral views in common. But the latter proposition is
absurd. Taken strictly, it would prevent us saying that the
morality of a given society had changed, and would compel
us instead to say that one society had disappeared and another
one taken its place. But it is only on this absurd criterion of
what it is for the same society to continue to exist that it could
be asserted without evidence that any deviation from a
society's shared morality threatens its existence.3 9
Ernest Nagel expresses a similar view:
[1]t is quite plausible to hold that human societies would be
impossible without the existence of a community of such
general moral ideas. . . . But however this may be, and
assuming that the notion of what it is for a society to be
destroyed has been clarified, neither logic nor history appears
to support the supposition that the violation of any specific
moral standards prescribed by public morality may threaten
the life of a social order.4"

39. HART, supra note 8, at 51-52.
40. Nagel, supranote 16, at 275.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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In short, Devlin faces a fundamental challenge. He must show us how a
social order may be destroyed by the failure to enforce particular moral
standards. Moreover, he faces the especially difficult task of demonstrating
to us how we must select those moral standards that are essential to the
preservation of society.
On the other hand, we should hasten to correct a widespread
misinterpretation ofDevlin's position. Many wrongly conclude that Devlin
is opposed to social change of any kind. That is not the case; his position
is more subtle than that. When the recommendations of the Wolfenden
Committee finally came before the British Parliament some nine years
after the Report had first been issued, Lord Devlin announced a change in
his position." He had not changed his mind about his philosophy; he
concluded that his method now dictated a different conclusion.42 In Britain,
as in most of the world, the political system is one of parliamentary
responsibility or unitary government. Put simply, that means that the party
with the most representatives in the legislature forms the government and
selects the Prime Minister.43 If the party in power fails to support its
government by refusing to adopt legislation submitted by it, a vote of no
confidence is called for." New elections would then be held within a very
short time. The prospect of such early elections is typically a sufficient
sanction to maintain party discipline.45 Normally, representatives in the
legislature who are members of the party in power really have very little
discretion with respect to whether they will support the government's
legislative recommendations.
An important, but very occasional, exception to this general practice
occurs when the government announces a free vote. In such a case,46
representatives will have to decide on the basis of their own conscience.
Clearly, in such instances, members of parliament would be open to
persuasive arguments. The government of the day announced that the
Wolfenden Committee recommendations would be the subject of a free
vote.47 That meant that leading citizens might suggest the better course of

41. See Law on Homosexuals, supra note 35, at 13.
42. See id.

43. See, e.g., A-Z of Parliament, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk_ politics/az_of parliament/p-q/82559.stm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
44. See, e.g., The United Kingdom Parliament, Government and Opposition, http://www.
parliament.uk/works/pagovopp.cfm (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Prime Minister (May 21, 1998), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/ukpolitics/az of parliament/p-q/82559.stm.
47. Speaking more technically, the government did not introduce the bill and did not take a
position on it. The Literary Enyclopedia, The Sexual Offences Act (1967), http://www.litencyc.com/
php/stopics.php?rec=-true&UID=!383 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) ("In May 1965, Lord Arran
introduced a bill to the House of Lords proposing the decriminalization of consensual homosexual

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
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action. In England, the time-honored manner of announcing such a
position is in a letter to The Times (London). Lord Devlin, joined by other
law Lords, did exactly that.48 In the letter, he announced that he now
supported adoption of the Wolfenden Committee recommendations. Why?
Because he no longer believed that consensual sexual contact between
adult homosexuals met his standard of beyond toleration. When he
delivered his lecture initially, he believed that was the case. But public
attitudes had shifted sufficiently in the interim to lead him to believe that
criminalizing homosexual conduct could no longer be justified on that
ground. This example shows us that Devlin is not unalterably opposed to
social change.4 9 We could characterize his view instead as wishing to keep
his foot firmly on the brake so as to keep the pace of social change as slow
as possible.
IV.

HART'S AMBIGUOUS DEFENSE OF MILL

We must now turn to a consideration of the strident criticisms of
Devlin's argument offered by Professor H.L.A. Hart. Hart was Professor
of Jurisprudence in Oxford from 1953 to 1968, joining the law teaching
staff at Oxford after World War ]1.50 After having been admitted to
practice as a Barrister, he served during the War in MI-5 .5 After that
experience, he returned to the academic world for the remainder of his
career. In 1962, he was invited to offer a series of lectures at Stanford,53
which were subsequently published as Law, Liberty, and Morality.54 In
those lectures, Hart unleashed his vigorous criticisms of Devlin's
position.55 Moreover, he also purported to defend Mill's harm principle,
at least with regard to "the enforcement of morality., 56 He took these
positions on the basis of several arguments. One of these I have set out in
the text above: that it is illogical to equate the change of any particular
strand of morality with the destruction of the entire society.57

sex. The bill was passed in June 1966. Labour M. P. Leo Abse introduced an identical bill to the
House of Commons the same month, and the bill was passed in December 1966.").
48. Law on Homosexuals, supra note 35, at 13.
49. See DEVLIN,supra note 8, at 18.
50. NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART, THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 119,

156, 297 (2004).
51. Id.at 84.
52. Id. at 119.
53. HART, supra note 8.
54. See HART, supra note 8.

55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. HART, supra note 8, at 5.
57. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3

12

Moffat: "Not the Law's Business": The Politics of Tolerance and the Enfor
DUN WODY COMMENTARY

Beyond that, he applies a distinction first offered in his previous work,
The Concept of Law. The distinction is between positive morality and
critical morality.59 In actuality, the distinction is not original; instead it
restates the distinction John Austin made between positive morality and
the principles of legislation.6" For Austin, the principles of legislation are
the precepts of utility which ought to guide the making of laws. Positive
morality, on the other hand, is the morality actually found in a society. In
contrast, critical morality is morality as it has been vetted by philosophers:
an ideal morality.
As it happens, ideal morality for both Austin and Hart is utilitarian
philosophy. Both took the attitude that the morality of society deserves no
particular respect in itself. Unlike William Blackstone, they have no
special regard for tradition. Instead, they believe that social morality
should be scrutinized on the basis of the principles of utility to determine
whether it warrants any respect.6 Only if it meets that critical standard
does it deserve to be given normative standing. Hart applies that
distinction to Devlin's position, concluding that Devlin has gone down the
wrong path by honoring anything that happens to be a part of positive
morality.6 2 Only critical morality, in Hart's mind, could warrant any
possible respect by the law. We could not justifiably enforce morality that
merely passes the irrational test of Devlin's indignation and disgust.
Critical morality, however, turns out to be a less than satisfactory
answer to the quest for a set of standards that the law can justifiably
enforce. As Ernest Nagel observes with respect to Hart's affection for
critical morality:
It is plain, however, that many systems of critical morality
have been developed, and that their conceptions of what is to
men's best interests do not always agree. There is certainly no
consensus even among deeply reflective men as to which
system of critical morality is the most adequate one, so that
legal paternalists are likely to differ among themselves .... 6 3
Nagel's critique turns our attention to Hart's purported defense of Mill's
harm principle. I label it "purported" because Hart carves out two very
large exceptions to the general principle of harm: paternalism' and

58. H.L.A. HART, ThE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).

59. See id. at 180-85.
60. JOHN AUSTIN, TtE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 112 (1954).
61. Id. at 3.
62. HART, supra note 8, at 23-24.
63. Nagel, supra note 16, at 281.
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nuisance.65 Most observers have noted that with a defender such as Hart,
Mill really needs no enemies. Why? On closer examination, the two
exceptions appear well-prepared to swallow up the entire principle.66 By
nuisance, he means, not noxious odors, but a legal nuisance, such as
bigamy. Bigamy creates a nuisance by clouding all kinds of legal questions
such as inheritance, custody of children, ownership of assets, and the rights
of the next of kin to make medical and after-death determinations.
However, paternalism is the eight-hundred pound gorilla. What can we
imagine that could not be prohibited on grounds of paternalism? And how
can an exception for paternalism possibly be consistent with Mill's harm
principle? There may be much that is indeterminate in what exactly
constitutes harm. But one plank of Mill's platform seems crystal clear: his
complete and utter rejection of paternalism. Recall once again what Mill
has to say on the subject:
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make
him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right.67
How, reading these lines, can we possibly say that paternalism could be
consistent with the harm principle? Indeed, once we start examining the
extensive list of behaviors that Hart thinks could justifiably be regulated
by government, it becomes difficult to imagine what activity might
possibly be immune from the government's interference. One might be
forgiven for reaching the conclusion that only homosexual behavior seems
to be exempt from the reach of government's hand. That result may not be
entirely accidental. Nicola Lacey's recent biography includes an
examination of Professor Hart's famously "ambiguous sexual identity. 68
Clearly, that particular issue was highly important to Hart. But surely, we
might hope for a broader swath of liberty to be protected by any purported
defender of Mill's harm principle.

65. Id. at 38-43.
66. See Nagel, supra note 16, at 280-81; MARTIN P. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 60-61
(1975). But see Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,in MORALITY AND THE LAW 125-26 (Wasserstrom
ed., 1971) (arguing that Mill himself conceded the necessity for paternalism in some situations).
67. MILL, supra note 9, at 73.
68. LACEY, supra note 50, at 74; see also David Pannick, The TroubledLife of a Tormented
Man and Brilliant Legal Philosopher, TIMES (London) Mar. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ article/0,,8163-1532391,00.html.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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V. FULLER'S ANALYSIS OF FREEDOM
In my own view, Lon Fuller, the late Carter Professor of Jurisprudence
at Harvard Law School, provides a superior, yet widely neglected, analysis
of Mill's attempt to defend freedom. 69 His important contribution has not
been considered as part of this debate, partly because Fuller published it
prior to the report of the Wolfenden Committee, and partly because Fuller
made his contribution part of a larger and more complex system of
thinking about law. Actually, I find it somewhat surprising that Hart at
least did not bring this distinction into play, because he would certainly
have been familiar with the version published two years after Fuller's by
Hart's Oxford colleague Isaiah Berlin.7"
Fuller distinguishes between freedom from and freedom to.7 ' Freedom
from is the absence of constraint: the undergraduate's ideal of drinking all
night and having no one who must be answered to. Freedom to, in contrast,
is empowerment: providing the capacity to carry out the actions you
desire. Freedom from is liberating in a negative sense; freedom to is
liberating in a positive sense. Freedom to, however, is qualified in that you
must comply with the requirements set down in the relevant matrix of
facilitation to succeed in achieving your purpose. Unlike Mill, Fuller
perceives that meaningful individual freedom requires that "decisions that
are made for the individual must be congruent with, and form a suitable
framework for, his own decisions."7 2
Mill asks how we can free human beings from the constraints imposed
by society and law. In contrast, Fuller asks: "How can the freedom of
human beings be affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by
laws, customs, institutions, or other forms of social order that can be
changed or preserved by purposive human actions?"73 The mention of
purpose, of course, raises one of Fuller's favorite subjects. He found
behaviorist views totally unacceptable for the simple reason that
behaviorists cannot account for purpose.74 Purpose does not exist in the
behaviorist universe. Fuller loved to skewer his Harvard colleague, the
famed behaviorist B.F. Skinner.7" Skinner modernized behaviorism by

69. Lon L. Fuller, Freedom-A SuggestedAnalysis, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1955). Fuller's
essay was first presented as a paper at a Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics at the University
of Chicago Law School in April 1954. See id. at 1305.
70. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY

118-72 (1969). The essay was delivered as Berlin's Inaugural Lecture at Oxford in October 1958
and was
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

originally published that year by the Clarendon Press.
Fuller, supra note 69, at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1308 n.2.
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adding to it the concept of operant conditioning-simply put, positive
incentives.7 6 Using his methods, he taught chickens to dance and pigeons
to hit a ping pong ball with their beaks.77 He assumed that they had no
purpose in doing so; he was simply conditioning them. Of course, the
observer could rightly wonder if the animal was not pursuing its purpose
to seek food.78 After all, food rewards were the positive conditioning
Skinner was using.79
Fuller, by contrast, assumes that we all have purposes.8" The question
then becomes: How is it possible to help you achieve your purposes?
Would freedom from be more useful in that regard than freedom to? In
some cases, freedom from might be more helpful in realizing our goals.
But, for the most part, we will need freedom to in order to reach any goal
that involves more than the absence of interference. Fuller argues that
there must be some "appropriate form of order that will carry the effects
of the individual decision over into the processes of society", and "a
congenial environment of rules and decisions."" These concepts are an
important addition to our analytical arsenal, and I shall return to them later
in our discussion.
VI. DURKHEIM'S FEAR OF ANOMIE
Before doing so, however, we must address a nagging question that
remains even after considering all of the many criticisms of Devlin's
position: Can there be some relationship between maintaining the morality
of a society and protecting it from disintegration? To explore that issue
further, we must turn to the work ofthe French philosopher and sociologist
Emile Durkheim. Durkheim was born and raised in a tiny Ashkenazim
village in rural France. 82 From this small, tightly knit environment, he
came to Paris in the 1890's.83 He proceeded in short order to produce two
very thick books.

76. See Robert C.L. Moffat, The IndispensableRole of Independent Ethical Judgment, 21
FLA. L. REV. 477, 481 (1969).

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See generally B.F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 59-69 (1953) (on rewards
and operant conditioning); see also Moffat, supra note 76, at 481.
80. See Fuller, supra note 69, at 1307.
81. Id. at 1314.
82. See LEWIS COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 161-62 (1971); ROBERT ALUM
JONES, EMILE DURKHEIM: AN INTRODUCTION TO FOUR MAJOR WORKS 12-23 (1986).
83. See JONES, supra note 82, at 12-23.
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A. Suicide as SocialPathology
The first was a study of suicide.84 Although that may sound somewhat
morbid, a very practical reason for his choice of subject was simply that
suicide was the sort of social pathology about which the government kept
the best statistics. Durkheim wanted to do a statistical analysis comparing
the rate of incidence of the social problem on the basis of demographic
variables to see what variation there might be between different groups.85
He discovered that Protestants were more likely to commit suicide than
Roman Catholics.8 6 Married persons are less prone to suicide than single
persons.8 7 Members of small families are less protected from suicide than
members of large families.88 Widowers are more likely to die at their own
hand than men whose wives are still living. 89
As a sociologist, he wanted to test the thesis that greater social
cohesion would reduce the probability of the occurrence of social
pathological events, such as suicide, crime, and juvenile delinquency.
Durkheim believed that if people were part of a community with strong
social bonds, if they experienced social cohesion, they would be less
subject to the dangers of anomie. 9 People who lived without the strong
bonds of social morality to bind them to the group, who experienced the
anarchy of normlessness, would be more subject to the temptations of
social deviation. 9 I By contrast, persons who experienced strong cohesion
would be less likely to stray from societal norms. 92 Social cohesion is
produced by adherence to the morality of society, by which Durkheim
means the collective conscience. 93 He tells us:
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average
citizens of the same society forms a determinate system
which has its own life; one may call it the collective or
common conscience. No doubt, it has not a specific organ as
a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach of
society. Nevertheless, it has specific characteristics which
make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of the
particular conditions in which individuals are placed; they

84.
1987).
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

EMiLE DURKHEuv, SUICIDE (George Simpson ed., J.A. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans.,
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pass on and it remains .... Moreover, it does not change with
each generation, but, on the contrary, it connects successive
generations with one another. It is, thus, an entirely different
thing from particular consciences, although it can be realized
only through them.94
Durkheim believed that members of society generally desire to be good
and that we feel better about ourselves when we feel a part of the
collective morality.95 Here, as with Edmund Burke, we receive a classic
picture of an organic view of society, in which society is greater than the
mere sum of the individuals within it at any given time. Recall Burke's
famous exhortation on that subject:
Society is indeed a contract .... It is to be looked on with
other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary
and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a
partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be
obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not
only between those who are living, but between those who
are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.96
Moreover, individuals participating in such a society not only feel good
about themselves and their social place, but perceive themselves as more
than a solitary individual. With the benefit of that perspective, Durkheim
spotted an entirely different function of the criminal law. We generally
view the purpose of the law as to punish the offender. Although that is
obviously the case, Durkheim saw a larger, but more subtle, purpose of the
criminal law as reaffirming for good citizens that they embrace the correct
values. Criminal law reinforces for all of us that we are doing what is right,
by punishing those who do wrong. In this way, criminal law strengthens
the social cohesion of the moral members of society.
B. FindingOrganic Solidarity
Durkheim's second work is The Division of Labor in Society.97 Here
Durkheim examines social solidarity in more detail. Already convinced of

94. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79-80 (George Simpson trans.,

1960).
95. EMILE DURKHEIM, SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 36 (D.F. Pocock trans., 1953) ("The

6lan, even the enthusiasm, with which we perform a moral act takes us outside ourselves and above
our nature ... ").
96. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790).

97. See DURKtEIM, supranote 94.
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its vital importance, he now seeks to find how it can be replicated in the
modem world. From personal experience, he knew the strong solidarity of
village life. 98 There, everybody knew everyone else's business, and most
villagers were able to perform most of the tasks of everyday life.
Durkheim classified that sort of solidarity as mechanical solidarity, on the
theory that the solidarity was based on mutual similarity: the attraction of
likenesses.99 We look alike. We think alike because we share the same
culture. We feel comfortable together because of our similarities. 100
Durkheim's challenge was to figure out how to translate that strong, but
primitive, solidarity to the apparent normlessness and anonymity of city
life. He thought he discovered the secret in the division of labor, which
could provide a basis for a superior form of cohesion: organic solidarity. 1
With his organic view of society, organic solidarity would clearly be
preferable. In the village, people performed many tasks. In the city, people
specialized. In the city, people no longer bother to bake their own bread;
they go to the boulangeriefor a fresh baguette or bateau. Then, they stop
next door at the fromagerie for some camembert to go with the bread.
Perhaps they stop at the charcuteriefor some saucisse or salade. A pain
de raisin from the patisseriewould make a nice dessert. All that remains
to complete the perfect picnic is a nice bottle from the chez de vins. In the
city, everyone specializes; this is the division of labor. Durkheim's vision
of the organic society is realized in the interdependence brought about by
the division of labor.0 2 Each part is dependent on every other part, and the
sum of all the parts is greater than the individual parts merely added
together.'0 3 Each part is useless by itself; it becomes viable only in
conjunction with all the others.'1° That is Durkheim's thesis of organic
solidarity.105

For much of the remainder of his life, Durkheim tried to invent
institutions that could bring organic solidarity to realization"0 6 in the
common conscience. He found that it was not an easy task. 10 7 Pretty
clearly, we are in fact dependent on the multiple specializations of others.
But does that interdependence generate solidarity? Frustration and anxiety
seem to be much more frequent products of our mutual dependence than
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solidarity. In Europe, many public industries have been taken over by
government.'s Union members in such industries maybe prohibited from
striking.'° 9 If, for example, the electrical workers have a grievance with the
government, they may simply shut off all electrical power during prime
television viewing time. Citizens are reminded of their dependence, but
appreciation of solidarity is far from their minds. Perhaps, we can
understand then why Durkheim, though he struggled mightily, never really
came up with a formula that brought organic solidarity to life.
Moreover, we have discovered in recent years that Durkheim's
dismissal of mechanical solidarity as primitive was markedly premature.
Primitive it may be, but human society seems to exhibit a distinct
preference for mechanical solidarity. Mechanical solidarity has erupted
with violent results in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Central Asia, in Indonesia, in
many parts of Africa, in several countries of Central America, in Malaysia,
and in the Philippines."' Clearly, mechanical solidarity poses a present
and paramount challenge to our efforts to find avenues toward peace in the
world.
VH. UNDERSTANDING THE POLYCULTURAL SOCIETY

Should we therefore declare Durkheim's Herculean efforts a failure?
Although he was unable to find a solution to the challenge he identified,
I believe that he correctly identified the problem. And the challenge he
saw is this: How can you generate social cohesion in modem society?
Modem society is different from the traditional village world. It differs not
only in its anonymity, in the richness of its urban texture, but also in that
it includes a multiplicity of subcultures. In previous writing, I labeled such
a society polycultural."' At that time, the term multicultural had not been
coined. Fortuitously, I did not choose that term. The reason is that
polycultural includes all of the subcultures of the society. On the other
hand, multicultural is limited to those subcultures on the politically correct
approved list. A very simple test distinguishes the unapproved subcultures.
If it is socially acceptable to tell jokes about a group, they cannot be on the
approved list. Rednecks would be a current example. Jokes about them
would not be generally considered a socialfauxpas.Presumably, cavemen

108. See, e.g., Robert Moffat, DemocracyandSocialism: Freedom andEqualityin the Welfare
State, in CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF LAW 307, 307-09, 315-17 (P. Trappe ed., 1983); see
also IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 104-08 (1980).
109. MOFFAT, supra note 108, at 307.
110. See, e.g., MONICA DUFFY ToFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE; IDENTITY,
INTERESTS, AND THE INDMVSIBILITY OF TERRITORY 1, 5, 17, 77, 79, 127, 130-31 (2003).
111. See Robert C.L. Moffat, Consent and the CriminalLaw, in Consent: Concept, Capacity,
Conditions, and Constraints (L.T. Sargent ed.), in BEIHEFT NF 12, ARCHIV FOR RECHTS-UND
SOZIAPHILOSOPHIE 147, 152-56 (1978).
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are not on the list either, since GEICO uses them as foils in their current
advertising campaign."'
A. Symbolic Crusades
However, from a polycultural standpoint, we cannot afford to exclude
any subcultures from the need for participation in the larger social
cohesion. To make our social cohesion as effective as we can, we must
make it as all-inclusive as we can. To exclude a subculture is to promote
social alienation, social distance. Modem societies have been much more
proficient at alienation than at inclusive cohesion. A good example of that
process in action is the adoption of Prohibition in the United States. Joseph
Gusfield's careful analysis of that chapter in our history concluded that it
was a "symbolic crusade.""' 3 A powerful coalition of rural, Republican,
Midwestern Protestants combined to stigmatize the values of urban,
Democratic, Roman Catholics as illegal and therefore immoral. The
motivating force that Gusfield identifies behind this movement is the
desire of the older groups of immigrants from Northern Europe to
reinforce by law both their political power and the rightness of their views
in the face of the political competition of the newly arriving groups from
Ireland and Southern Europe. 1 4 As Eskridge details, the campaigns to
stigmatize homosexuals have been similarly motivated.' One payoff for
the successful majority is the reaffirmation of the rightness of their views.
But that stigmatization creates social distance and alienation. As Eskridge
correctly observes, alienation is deadly to a pluralist democratic society:
"Alienation of many groups brings the polity down.""' 6 Social cohesion is
strengthened only in the subcultures on both sides of the divide. But in the
society as a whole, cohesion is weakened.
B. Amplifying Deviance
Another concept that I find helpful in this exploration comes from the
English criminologist Leslie Wilkins." 7 The name he gives his
contribution is a pure sociologism. Nonetheless, I find it to be quite a
112. See, e.g., Seth Stevenson, The Brillianceof Geico 's "Tiny House," SLATE, July 25, 2005
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114. Id. at 7-8, 22, 123, 155-56, 196.
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useful tool. His warning is against the danger of what he calls the
"deviation-amplifying [feedback] system." '" 8 Though a mouthful, hidden
behind all that jargon is the idea that when we label the values of a
particular subgroup as bad, we run a serious risk of generating backlash.' 19
The very act of labeling may cause the group to hold their values even
more determinedly than ever.120 Moreover, when we arouse backlash, we
may be tempted unwisely to crack down even harder on the 'wrongdoers'
to try to make them conform.' 21 The government may strengthen the
already existing sanctions for noncompliance.' 22 If the disaffected groups
do not share the values of the dominant society, the law will be to them
purely an expression of force without any foundation in a perceived moral
obligation. Enforcement of the law under such conditions tends to be more
selective, to rely on the use of informants, and to lapse into other unsavory
practices that cast aspersions on the integrity of the legal process.'23 As we
slide down this slippery slope into legal immorality, Wilkins' feedback
system warns us that we also run the risk of increasing the probability of
deviant behavior. The consequence that interests me most, however, for
purposes of the present discussion, is that social distance of the disaffected
group will be increased and whatever social cohesion existed previously
will be eroded.
To take an example from the Prohibition era, we can imagine the rural
Protestants in the Midwest saying to the recently arrived Italian family,
"Your values are immoral, and now we have established that they are also
illegal, because you despicable people have wine with your meals." The
new immigrants may react by saying that they have always done that, and,
though they hadn't really thought about it too much previously, they now
realize, as they do think about it, that wine with dinner is a very important
part of their culture. They may assert that the practice is more important
to them than they had realized. In that way, by embracing the stigmatized
value more strongly, their deviance is amplified by the symbolic
disapproval expressed by the intolerant majority. Why, they would ask,
should those narrow-minded bigots out on the farm dictate to us what our
lifestyle should be?
Homosexuals ask the same question. When we, as a society, label a
behavior of the subculture immoral and criminal, we run the risk that the

118. Id. at 91.
119. Id. at 91-92.
120. Id. at 92.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. For a more extensive treatment of this point, see Robert C.L. Moffat, Obligationto Obey
the Law: Substance andProcedure in the Thought of Lon Fuller, I INT'L J.APPLIED PHIL. 33, 38
(1983).
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subculture will embrace the value even more strongly than they did before.
That may even be the case with some homosexuals, and others may
develop very strong suspicions of government in general. For example, the
noted libertarian philosopher John Hospers' bitter hostility toward
government in general may have been motivated by what he perceived as
government persecution of homosexuals.124 In any event, the bottom line
is that the subgroup experiences greater social distance, and the social
cohesion of the overall society is reduced. Social solidarity is lost. The
subgroup is alienated from society. The subculture is distanced further
from society rather than becoming more integrated into it.
Of course, backlash may work in the opposite direction as well. A
noteworthy example is provided by the ruling of the Supreme Judicial
'
Court of Massachusetts in Goodridgev. Department ofPublic Health,25
which held that the Massachusetts Constitution required that same-sex
couples must be allowed to marry. 126 We would be guilty of gross
understatement if we declared that the ruling attracted merely glaring
publicity and aroused only widespread protest. Indeed, constitutional
referenda prohibiting same-sex marriage were presented to the voters in
eleven states during the 2004 election. 127 The constitutional amendments
passed in every case. 128 In several cases, the amendments were so broad as
to outlaw mere civil unions. 129 In at least one case, the amendment was so
broad that it outlawed existing legal powers previously available to
unmarried couples. 3 '
We may observe in passing that the phenomenon of the referendum
provides an unusual opportunity for groups that feel alienated from the
legislative process. If the legislature allows a practice such as gay marriage
that you find distasteful, you may still reelect your representatives because
you like other things they have voted for or because you appreciate
appropriations they have obtained that benefit the district in which you
live. But a referendum permits the expression of opinion on one isolated
issue; it is a dream come true for the single-issue voter. Expression of
disagreement with a particular practice is facilitated by the availability of

124. See, e.g., John Hospers, The Nature of the State, in "MinimalGovernment" in Theory and
Practice:AMINTAPHIL III (Robert Moffat ed., 1978), in 59 THE PERSONALIST 321,389-404 (John
Hospers ed., 1978) (noting that politicians often use governmental power for oppression or other
undemocratic ends).
125. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
126. Id. at 968.
127. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, SayingNo to 'IDo, 'WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A8 (noting
the struggle facing proponents of gay marriage).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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the referendum process, and we have witnessed extensive use of it on the
issue of gay marriage.
Apart from demonstrating the very real fact of backlash, the results of
these referenda also demonstrate a common confusion between the
religious and civil institutions that we refer to as marriage. Good reason
for that confusion exists in the historical heritage of all family law
including inheritance, because it was originally in the hands of the church.
Such matters were governed by Canon Law and were within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.131 In Western society, however,
those functions have been separated for some time, although religious
institutions in many jurisdictions are still authorized to act as proxies for
the state by accepting the vows, recording the signatures of the parties and
the witnesses, and submitting the paperwork to the state for inclusion in
the official records so as to make it a legal document.'32
One possible approach might be to make a clearer segregation of the
civil and religious functions. Such a strategy would take advantage of the
fact that public opinion seems to favor civil unions, but not gay marriage.
Could we make it clear that the state authorizes only civil unions with all
of the legal rights and responsibilities attendant to that intimate
relationship? The institution of marriage would then be left to the
exclusive province of the religious institutions. Would that solution be an
effective compromise? The hurdle seems to be the substantial emotional
energy that is attached to the symbol of marriage on both sides of the
issue. We have already taken note of the backlash against gay marriage
expressed in the sometimes rather aggressive rejection enshrined in the
various referenda adopted in a number of states. The other side of that coin
is the strong desire frequently expressed by gay persons not to be relegated
to what they perceive as second-class status. The legal benefits of marriage
are desirable, but they crave the implicit social approval of the complete
label. With such deeply entrenched emotions on both sides, avoiding
backlash seems elusive.
Yet another recent example of backlash is provided by the widespread
reaction to the recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Kelo v.
City of New London.133 That case expanded the permissible uses by local
government of eminent domain to aid private businesses.134 The public
response was vehement and far-reaching.' 35 The immediate outcry of
protest has resulted in many large, socially worthwhile projects being

See, e.g., G. RADCLIFFE & G. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 231-32 (2d ed. 1946).
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.07 (2005).
133. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
134. Id. at 2668.
135. Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, FrustrationandAnger at Court
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A20.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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dropped for fear of adverse publicity.'36 Moreover, many bills have been
introduced at both the state and federal levels that would significantly curb
the use of the eminent domain power by local governments.' 37 As is often
the case with backlash, the pendulum is in danger of swinging too far in
the other direction.
C. The Pitfalls of Negative Reciprocity
The foregoing instances of backlash also serve as examples of what I
have termed "negative reciprocity."' 38 Yes, alienation erodes allegiance to
the society at large. But, more dire consequences often ensue. Hence,
alienation from the larger culture does not tell the entire story of the perils
for society. More extreme alienation may erupt into cycles of negative
reciprocity. We can see the escalation of 'tit-for-tat' violence in many of
the ethnic and religious conflicts around the globe. In our own case of
Prohibition, organized crime received a huge boost, not just from the
skyrocketing demand for goods that had been unwisely declared
contraband, but also from the acquiescence of communities alienated from
the culture at large by that symbolic crusade. 3 9
Similarly, we could note the alienation from society indicated by the
hostility of some homosexual political action groups, such as ActUp, in the
vituperation of their reactions to the perceived failure of the government
to devote sufficient resources to AIDS research. 4 ° As it happens, much
medical research money was diverted from cancer research to research on
the HIV virus,' 4 ' but the perception of some in the gay community was that
perceived inaction expressed social hostility to their lifestyle.' 42 In all of
136. See infra note 137.
137. Michael Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent-Domain UproarImperils Projects, WALL
Aug. 3, 2005, at B 1.
ST. J.,
138. I first developed this notion in the Steintrager Lecture at Wake Forest University. See
Robert C.L. Moffat, Negative Reciprocities and Neglected Responsibilities: A Requiem for
Rights?, The James A. Steintrager Lecture in Political Philosophy and Jurisprudence at Wake
Forest University 15 (Sept. 22, 1994) (transcript on file at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law Legal Information Center). I have since discovered that the concept has been widely
employed in the field of game theory in advanced economics. See, e.g., Daniel Friedman &
Nirvikar Singh, Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes (University of
California Santa Cruz Economics Department, Working Paper Series 1028, 2003), availableat
http://econwpa.wustl.edu:80/eps/game/papers/0412/0412003.pdf.
139. See, e.g., JOHN LANDESCO, ORGANIZED CRIME INCHICAGO 189-221 (1929).
140. Bruce Lambert, 3,000 AssailingPolicy on AIDS Ring City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1989, at B3.
141. The AIDS Political Machine: By Demanding Enormous Research Funds and
QuestionableDrugs, Have Activists Distortedthe Response to the Epidemic?, TIME, Jan. 22, 1990
(discussing that money targeted to AIDS reduces funding for cancer research).
142. John S. James, New Threats to AIDS Research FundingAIDS, 97 TREATMENT NEWS,
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these cases, the undesirable consequences of alienation from society occur
almost effortlessly. As I observed in earlier work:
When political positions are presented as claims of right
buttressed by ideologies so dogmatic that other possibilities
cannot be recognized as having potential legitimacy, we can
understand why our present trend toward reduced civility in
political and cultural discourse seems inevitable) 43
Reestablishing any degree of social integration of the alienated groups into
society is much more difficult. In short, how can we put the warring
subcultural genies back into the bottle of social integration?
In several of my earlier writings on this theme, I floated the idea of
encouraging positive toleration.'" Obviously, I was caught up in a moment
of uncharacteristic optimism. At that time, I proposed that we embrace as
a principal and fundamental value of our polycultural society, not merely
the toleration as Professor Eskridge proposes,' 45 but the celebration of the
distinctive characteristics of our many subcultures. How feasible is such
a utopian ideal? Clearly, overcoming the natural biases born of our innate
mechanical solidarity constitutes a substantial challenge for any society.
Importantly, Professor Eskridge does make clear, however, that his
"Constitution of Tolerance" is a two-way street, in which both sides must
pay heed to the sensibilities of the other.'46 On the other hand, we face a
significant challenge in drawing the line beyond which we do not demand
that we extend our tolerance. Some subgroups would necessarily fall
outside of the pale of acceptance: child molesters, for example. But, we
could not exclude all criminals as a class, because that would assume the
wisdom of all existing criminal laws, including those for which no genuine
justification actually exists.
VIII.

DESPERATELY SEEKING TOLERATION: FREEDOM AND
RECIPROCITY

The pursuit of positive toleration, however, turns out to be even more
complex than it might appear at first glance. Such an investigation requires
an exploration of the meaning of freedom, of the relevance of the meansends relationship, and of the significance of positive reciprocity. As it
happens, Lon Fuller's analysis, set out previously, provides a most useful

143. Robert C.L. Moffat, Rights and New Fundamentalisms: New Essays in Toleration,
BEIHEFT 19 RECHTSTHEORIE 55, 56 (Eugene E. Dais et al. eds., 1998).
144. See Moffat, supra note 111, at 154-56.
145. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1051.
146. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3
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understanding of the problem. To begin, we need to apply his distinction
between freedom from and freedom to in analyzing the present issues.
A. Freedom
Let us take as a case study the question of the marriage of same-sex
couples. At least since Lawrence v. Texas,'4 7 such couples presumably
assume that they are free from the interference of law in their intimate
relationships. Hence, they enjoyfreedomfrom interference with regard to
expression of their sexual preferences. But with the two exceptions noted
above, they do not have the freedom to marry. From their vantage point,
the lack of freedom to leaves them at a significant disadvantage compared
to the rest of society.
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
itself employed Fuller's distinction in Goodridge, in which it ruled that
homosexual couples must be allowed to marry: "[I]ndividual liberty and
equality safeguards . . . protect both 'freedom from' unwarranted
government intrusion into protected spheres of life and 'freedom to'
partake in benefits created by the State for the common good. Both
freedoms are involved [in the issue of same-sex marriage.]"' 4 8 How
dispositive of the issue should we take the court's analysis to be?
One question we might ask is: How much practical difference would
marriage make to gay couples, other than the joy of acquiring the coveted
symbolic label? Putting the symbol aside for the moment, marriage carries
with it a significant basket of rights, privileges, and responsibilities. For
the most part, this basket would come with the availability of a civil union.
They would have rights to marital property, inheritance rights, insurance
coverage, social security benefits, tax advantages, and authority to make
medical decisions and after death decisions for the partner. Altogether this
basket of legal powers and privileges sounds pretty significant. Civil
unions, then, constitute a quite significant package offreedoms to.
Although a fair number of these legal rights and privileges can be
acquired by executing a variety of sometimes complex legal documents,
the process is laborious and expensive. Interestingly enough, in
Scandinavia, where marriage between opposite sex couples has become
increasingly rare, some couples are choosing after a number of years and
several children together to get married.'4 9 When they look into it, they

147. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sexual
activity was unconstitutional as it applied to adult males having consensual sex in their home).
148. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003) (citations
omitted).
149. Noelle Knox, Nordic Family Ties Don't Mean Tying the Knot, USA TODAY, Dec. 15,
2004, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-12-15-marriagex.htm. Ms. Knox
reports that inheritance rights do make a difference in the decision: "That's why Espen Aasen and
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discover that marriage is a much simpler procedure than trying to execute
all of the legal documents necessary to acquire all of the rights and
privileges they desire. So, after several children and many years together,
they may just go ahead and get married because it turns out to be much
easier that way.150 Similarly, civil unions greatly simplify an otherwise
much more complicated legal situation for same sex couples who wish to
give legal status to their mutual commitment.
B. Means and Ends
In comparing civil unions and outright gay marriage, however,
examining the relationship between means and ends will also aid our
understanding of the issues. In that regard, Fuller also found Mill's view
of the means-end relation to be inadequate.'51 On the relation between
means and ends, Mill took the conventional Utilitarian view:
All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it
seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and
colour from the end to which they are subservient. When we
engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we
are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need, instead
of the last we are to look forward to.'
Fuller, echoing his exposition of freedom to, saw Mill's perspective as
naYve:
Mill seemed strangely blind to the fact that in all significant
areas of human action formal arrangements are required to
make choice effective. The choices a man can make without
requiring collaborative social effort for their realization are
trivial. Our more important choices are meaningless if there
is no way of carrying them over into the larger social order on
which we are dependent for almost all our satisfactions. But,

Trine Anker got married four years ago. They had been living together for 10 years and had two
children. Then, they bought a book on how to draw up a partnership contract, which many couples
do to protect their assets in case of a breakup. In the end, they decided it was easier to get married."
Id. See Noelle Knox, Religion Takes a Back Seat in Western Europe, USA TODAY, Aug. 11,2005,
at I A; Stanley Kurtz, UnhealthyHaifTruths, ScandinavianMarriageIs Dying, NATIONAL REVIEW
ONLINE, May 25, 2004, http://nationalreview.com/Kurtz/Kurtz200405250927.asp; Cheryl
Wetzstein, ScandinavianMarriageScorned as Modelfor U.S., WASH. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at 1.
150. See id.
151. Lon Fuller, Means and Ends, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 47, 50 (Kenneth
Winston ed., 1981).
152. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 2 (New
American ed. 1951).
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to give social effect to individual choice, some formal
arrangement, some form of social order, is necessary.'53
Not only is consideration of means as important as choosing ends, but our
deliberations are aided by a calculation both of means-cost and meanssurplus.'54 For example, in choosing between a policy of civil unions or
same-sex marriage, we should take into consideration the backlash against
gay marriage as a means-cost. Civil unions, on the other hand, would
provide a means-surplus, in which the societal balance sheet is aided by a
reduction in negative reciprocity and by the positive contribution to social
cohesion.155 Ironically, Fuller's methodology accounts for the
consequences of social policy much more comprehensively than does
Mill's utilitarianism.
C. Reciprocity and Toleration
Additionally, we must attend to Fuller's analysis of reciprocity because
that also provides insight into the issue. Reciprocity for Fuller is a
justifiable reliance that arises from expectancies growing out of patterns
of behavior.156 His approach would echo Blackstone's respect for
tradition,'57 rather than Austin's disregard of it.'58 Fuller also took note that
reciprocity was achieved optimally when three preconditions were
present.' 59 The equivalence of the exchange, the voluntariness of the
bargain, and the reversibility of the roles in the relationship all served to
enhance the strength of the obligation that was perceived to arise from the
reciprocity."' Applying these analytical tools to the question of tolerating
gay relationships as contrasted with legalizing same-sex marriage leads to
some interesting conclusions.
To do so, we must first pay attention to the well-established tradition
that marriage in Western society is a contract between one man and one
woman. Moreover, that tradition is highly normative in character.
Heterosexual marriage is no mere societal habit; society at large perceives
that arrangement as the only defensible version of the institution.' 6 1 In

153. Fuller, supra note 69, at 1312.
154. Fuller, supra note 151, at 56-58.
155. See John Culhane & Stacey Sobel, The Gay MarriageBacklash andits SpilloverEffects:
Lessons From a (Slightly) "Blue State, "40 TULSA L. REv. 443, 448-49 (2005).
156. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 19-20 (rev. ed. 1969).
157. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT., 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70
(1st American ed. 1771).
158. See Austin, supra note 60, at 30.
159. See Fuller, supra note 156, at 20, 23.
160. See id.
161. See supranote 127.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 5 [2005], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 57

contrast, the latter part of the twentieth century in Western society has
been characterized by the sexual revolution in which the view has become
widely adopted that what someone does in the bedroom with another
consenting adult is the business of absolutely no one else. Hence, we are
not surprised at the acceptance of decisions like Lawrence v. Texas,'62 that
make the bedrooms of homosexuals off-limits to the law.' 63 That degree
of toleration, however, does not at all extend to gay marriage.' 64 On that
issue, the normative expectancies founded on well-established tradition
trump impulses of toleration.
To explore Fuller's preconditions of optimum reciprocity, we must
attempt to define the comparative bargains. The first bargain could be
viewed as an agreement not to interfere in the private expression of sexual
preferences by consenting adults. The second bargain Would be an
agreement that we will allow any two (or more?) consenting adults to enter
into a marriage. Both bargains appear superficially to satisfy the criterion
of equivalence. However, societal tradition upsets the apparent balance, as
the latter bargain is a direct affront to expectations while the former
bargain requires only the absence of interference by the state. Similarly,
voluntariness might seem apparently present for both bargains, but the
positive action of the state in the face of established social practice would
arouse considerable dissent to the claim of voluntariness. Again, the
absence of state action will find a general acquiescence based on a mutual
acceptance of the right to be left alone.
By the same token, reversibility favors government inaction. The
populace is for the greater part comfortable with the notion: "If you don't
bother us, we won't bother you." But when the question posed is whether
governmental power should be used in an affirmative way to extend an
institution widely perceived as confined to opposite-sex couples to samesex couples, reversibility comes to a screeching halt. Most heterosexuals
cannot ever imagine having a homosexual orientation.'65 Similarly, most
gay persons do not wish to imagine being straight.'66 The possibility of

162. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
163. See id. at 578.
164. Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Civil Union Statutes:A Shortcutto Legal EqualityforSame-Sex
Partnersin a Landscape Littered with Defense of MarriageActs, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
229, 231-34 (2004).
165. Cf G.M. Herek, Psychological Heterosexism and Anti-Gay Violence: The Social
PsychologyofBigotry andBashing,in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS
AND GAY MEN 149-69 (G.M. Herek & K.T. Berrill eds., 1992); see also Dale Carpenter, Heartof
Darkness, BAY AREA REPORTER, June 23, 2005, reprinted in The Independent Gay Forum,
http://www.indegayforum.org/authors/carpenter/carpenter69.html (discussing anti-gay attitudes).
166. There are of course the exceptions of bisexual persons and of those who "convert" to the
orientation. See Richard Bevan, Gay Today, Hasbian Tomorrow, Sept. 6, 2004,
http://www.rainbownetwork.com/Features/detail.asp?iData-=21550&iCat-- 105&iChannel=25&n 30
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reversibility is remote. Applying Fuller's preconditions for the optimum
realization of reciprocity helps us understand the rather broad gulf between
popular support for toleration of gays and the emotion behind the rejection
of gay marriage. As Eskridge concludes: "The politics of tolerance
creating a
strongly counsels that the Court do nothing [toward
' 61 7
being."
time
the
for
marriage]
gay
to
right
constitutional
IX. WHERE IS THE JUDICIAL PARADIGM HEADED?

Professor Eskridge makes several references to the evolution of
constitutional law on this subject in terms that suggest paradigm theory.
Specifically, he refers to a particular interpretation of the Constitution
' and similarly, "the apex of its triumph."' 69 The use
reaching its "zenith"168
of these metaphors invites speculation regarding the prospects for the
United States Supreme Court to follow the Massachusetts case in applying
equal protection doctrine to create a right to same-sex marriage.
Clearly, a move from the prohibition of state interference in purely
private adult activities, represented by Lawrence, to ajudicial requirement
that states must officially recognize and accept same-sex marriage, as in
Goodridge,should be viewed as a paradigm shift. 7 ° A shift to a paradigm
of mandatory recognition by states of a positive right to marriage by any
two consenting adults should occur only under circumstances in which the
existing paradigm of non-interference has come to be viewed as
unsatisfactory. An example of such a paradigm shift would be the sort of
change illustrated by the breakdown in persuasiveness of the "separate but
equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson7 ' and its replacement in Brown v. Board

of Education'72 with a new paradigm of equal protection.
Under what conditions do such paradigm shifts occur?
New paradigms arise in response to dissatisfaction with the
existing paradigm. Several factors are potentially responsible
for such change: 1) the inconsistency of the old paradigm's
rationale with the rationales of other rule paradigms; 2) the
perceived unfairness ofthe existing rationale of the paradigm;
and/or 3) the failure of the social definition of the situation

Channel=Features.
167. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1058.
168. Id. at 1041.
169. Id. at 1042.
170. See generally Robert C.L. Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of
Morality and Law in Interaction,37 FLA. L. REV. 297, 324-26 (1985) (on paradigm theory).
171. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896).
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assumed by the rule to meet presently accepted standards of
morality. 7

The application of these tests can be illustrated by the Plessy/Brown
paradigm shift. When Brown supplanted the rule of Plessy, each of the
above factors was involved: inconsistency with the rationale of other
rule/paradigms, perceived unfairness of the rationale of "separate but
equal," and perceived failure of the social situation of blacks as defined by
the rule to match the existing standards of morality. 174 The perceived
unfairness of the rationale of Plessy is shown by the failure of the Court
to apply it purposefully for such a long period prior to Brown. Likewise,
the language of those cases shows that the Court had become increasingly
uncomfortable with the implicit expression of moral approval for a caste
system in American society.175 Finally, in its treatment of racial equality
in the restrictive covenant cases 176 and in the voting rights cases,17 7 the
Court had been applying rules whose rationale could be made consistent
with the rationale
of "separate but equal" only with great strain and
78
discomfort.1

Application of these tests to the issue of gay marriage does not yield
results that suggest an imminent paradigm shift in the direction of mandatory
state recognition. Rather, strained constitutional analysis would be required
to make a persuasive argument that refusal by a state to adopt same-sex
marriage is inconsistent with the rationales of the jurisprudence of other equal
protection decisions. Certainly, great difficulty would be encountered in
arguing that there is widespread unfairness perceived in the existing rationale
of 'live, and let be' of Lawrence.'79 The social definition of the situation
assumed by Lawrence would have to be stated as the bedroom activities of
consenting adults are, as the Wolfenden Committee said, "not the law's
business.""' That rationale appears rather clearly to reflect the presently accepted
standards of societal morality. To sum up, the foundation for a paradigm

173.
174.
175.
176.

Moffat, supranote 170, at 339.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)

(holding that the state court's

enforcement of racially restrictive covenants would be a violation of equal protection).
177. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (holding that restrictive covenants

based on race are illegal on equal protection grounds); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664-65
(1944) (holding that a primary voting scheme violated minority voting rights); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327-29 (1941) (holding that criminal sanctions for violating racial
restrictions in primary voting were illegal).
178. Moffat, supra note 1.70, at 339.
179. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
180. WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
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shift has not yet been put in place. Prospects for such a shift seem
somewhat remote.
Our understanding can be aided by contrasting an earlier, but related,
paradigm shift. Bowers v. Hardwick8 ' had sustained a Georgia statute that
criminalized consensual adult homosexual activity in private.'82 The
paradigm shift from that case to Lawrence seems reasonably predictable.
Bowers always seemed uncomfortable side by side with other liberty and
equal protection cases. From the beginning, the case was widely excoriated
for the unfairness of its treatment of members of society who had as much
a right to be let alone as all the rest of us.'83 Finally, the social definition
of the situation of consenting adult homosexuals was clearly perceived as
undeserving of legal stigmatization. 84 Hence, their treatment under
Bowers was clearly perceived both as unfair and as inconsistent with
contemporary moral standards. For all these reasons, the demise of Bowers
in Lawrence should not have come as much of a shock.
X. CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

185

The foregoing treatment, I believe, makes clear the central importance
of moral argument, both in its academic form, and in the popular form.
Especially when the balance of popular opinion can shift with the slightest
breeze, caution seems to be essential. As Oliver Wendell Holmes warned
over a century ago, "[w]e do not realize how large a part of our law is open
to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind."' 86
I believe that those words of warning must be taken to heart, especially by
the academic community. During my academic career, I have noticed that
181. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
182. Id. at 196.
183. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 156-

73 (1999); see also Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 21-41 (2002-2003). It is also worth taking note that "[b]etween
1980 and 2002, courts in ten states-Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee-ruled their state's anti-gay sex
laws to be unsonstitutional." B.A. Robinson, Criminalizing Same-Sex Behavior, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom-laws3.htm. These results on the state level indicate a
weakening in whatever persuasive power Bowers might be deemed to have had; see Moffat, supra
note 170, at 314-16 (discussing the role of persuasive argument generally), 326-29 (analyzing the
loss of persuasive power of Betts v. Brady).
184. Prior to Lawrence, support for legalization of same-sex relations had reached 60% pro
and 35% con. However, some degree of backlash in response to that case resulted in a fall off to
a slight plurality of only 48% to 46%. Susan Page, Poll Shows Backlash on Gay Issues, USA
TODAY, July 28, 2003.
185. With abject apologies to one of my heroes, Soren Kierkegaard. See Soren Kierkegaard,
CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS (Howard V. Hong & Edna
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most of the ideas advanced by my colleagues have had no impact on the
real world. In most cases, I have considered that fact something for which
we should offer heartfelt thanks. However, ideas sometimes do make a
difference in the world at large, and sometimes those ideas can be worldaltering in their effects. 8 7 For that reason, we should attempt to be
judicious in our academic judgments, however uncommon that may be in
the contemporary academic scene.
For the greater part, Professor Eskridge's lecture presents a wellmodulated analysis of the legal treatment of homosexuals, arriving at a
balanced position quite similar to the conclusions I have reached in this
Commentary. Obviously, I am very clear in seeing that his analysis must
be correct. However, I was both shocked and dismayed to arrive at the
concluding paragraph of his fine essay in which he appears to equate the
opponents of gay marriage with the few members of the National Guard
Military Police who abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 188 Would it be
lacking in politesse to observe that such an approach may not be the most
successful manner in which to win friends and influence people, especially
in the 'Red' states?
It may be helpful in this context to review some of the points of the
present essay. John Stuart Mill's harm principle really amounts to the right
to be left alone. Even the secondary harms delineated by John Kaplan do
not abridge that fundamental value. Devlin's fear of societal disintegration
makes him willing to breach that ideal, but only in the most extreme
circumstances. Hart's paternalism poses a threat to it, but that threat finds
its basis in the elitism of Hart's recognition of critical morality as the
exclusive justification for public policy. Durkheim's fear of anomie would
allow him to approve inroads on privacy, but only in the overweening
public interest in maintaining social solidarity. Placing our quest in the
context of the polycultural society, we noticed the threat to individual
autonomy posed by moral crusades that manufacture deviance at the cost
of social alienation and in the face of escalating negative reciprocity. This
odyssey led us to explore the central importance of mutual positive

187. One of many examples would be the role of ideas in how Poland became enslaved and
how, in turn, the nation regained its freedom. See Robert C.L. Moffat, How Law Can Pave the Road
to Perpetual Peace, in KANT AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Justyna
Miklaszewska ed., forthcoming 2005).
188. The version of Professor Eskridge's article to which this section of the Commentary
responds contained specific references to Abu Ghraib. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics:
Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion 55 (Sept. 12,2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Eskridge, unpublished manuscript] (penultimate
version of Eskridge, supra note 19). Professor Eskridge omitted these references in the published
version of his article. See Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1062-64. I also welcome the softening, to a
degree, of his rhetoric linking gay toleration to our attitudes regarding terrorism. The spirit,
however, remains, and the issue raised in his penultimate version still needs to be confronted. 34
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toleration as an indispensable ingredient in the success and progress of our
society. We took note of Professor Eskridge's important affirmation that
toleration is a two-way street and that "[a]lienation of many groups brings
the polity down."' 89
How in the context of that celebration of tolerance are we to view his
allegations of "unspeakable physical abuse"' 9 ° of prisoners as evidence of
"a politics of dehumanization"? 9 ' I took earlier note of the rampaging
problems born of mechanical solidarity that plague so many parts of the
world. There is much more than enough dehumanization to go around. But
to focus exclusively on ordinary Americans who wish to be vigilant
against the hydra-headed terrorist threat as the embodiment of hate and
suspicion is as one-sided as Anita Bryant's vituperation against
'
homosexuals. 92
If we wish to bridge the divide that alienation threatens, we cannot
embrace either one side or the other in the culture wars. For many who live
in the Northeast, the arrogant, cynical, condescending, sometimes coherent
ramblings of columnist Frank Rich of the New York Times maybe gospel.
His irredentism, however, does not play well in Peoria. Regrettably, we
find an excess of smug self-satisfaction on both sides of the cultural
divide. To embrace either is to fail in our quest for positive toleration.' 93
If Professor Eskridge seeks tolerance of homosexuals only from those who
believe that the extremism of militant Islamic fundamentalists is caused
only by policies of the West in general and the United States in particular,
then he is merely preaching to the choir. To avoid making his contribution
a waste of good paper, he must avoid the dueling demonizations that tempt
him so gravely.
What, in my view, would a more balanced perspective look like? That
most Americans fear further terrorist efforts is undeniable. Have they
overreacted? In some respects, possibly. But Muslims have not been
rounded up and placed in internment camps. They have not been expelled
from the country. The United States forces in Iraq have avoided the
massive retaliation to which a less well-disciplined force would be sorely
tempted. Are the actions at Abu Ghraib deplorable? Of course. But to
equate those behaviors with homicide-bombings, with the frenetic display
of burned and mutilated corpses by hooded villains, with the practice of
human sacrifice in the throat-cuttings of innocent non-combatants is to
become blind to what is "unspeakable." In such a warped view, we have
surely lost our moral compass completely. We should be greatly saddened
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at the tragic debasement of a great religion by practitioners who are untrue
to its most fundamental tenets and who take no pride in the preservation
by Islam of much great learning from antiquity during the abysmal void
in the West during the long Dark Ages. But, we can refuse to remain
vigilant toward the threat the terrorists make of returning the entire world
to those Dark Ages only at our peril.
Who should bear the responsibility for the deplorable actions at Abu
Ghraib? The errant reservists would be appropriate guests on the Jerry
Springer show. They have and are being punished.' 94 But we should not
forget that one reason that all members of our armed services may not be
of the high quality we would prefer is that we have decided through
cowardly inaction that the burden of service should not be shared equitably
among the members of our society. The refusal to consider a draft is one
indicator. Less obvious is the utterly shameful refusal of many of our
premier institutions of higher learning, such as Harvard and Yale, to
include ROTC programs in their curricula.' 95 Many of those who might
voluntarily choose to serve their country are excluded from the opportunity
to pursue that career choice. Given the hypocrisy and mendacity of our
arrogant elitism, we should be surprised that those who serve their country
are of the high quality they generally are.
Perhaps all of this exploration is useful in reminding us how large a
task it is to practice the politics of tolerance. I am afraid that Professor
Eskridge sadly misses the mark when he identifies toleration of gays with
opposition to the combat of terrorism.'96 Frank Rich would undoubtedly
agree with his view.'97 But, although he would be unhappy to hear it, Rich
is, after all, merely a journalist.'98 Those of us in the academic community
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Reach of War: The Verdict; U.S. SoldierFoundGuilty in IraqPrisonAbuse Case,N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2005, at Al.
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198. Robert C.L. Moffat, Mustering the Moxie to Master the Media Mess: Some Introductory
Comments in the Questfor Media Responsibility, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137-49 (1998)

(critiquing journalistic discourse).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss5/3

36

Moffat: "Not the Law's Business": The Politics of Tolerance and the Enfor
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

1133

should strive to meet a considerably higher standard of discourse. Thus, I
would much prefer that we remember instead Professor Eskridge's worthy
injunction that "[a]lienation of many groups brings the polity
down."' 9 9 Overcoming alienation to achieve positive toleration is surely a
worthy goal for our society on which all persons of good will should unite.
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